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Let them alone: they be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch. Matthew 15:14

Pieter Brueghel, The Parable of the Blind (1568). Oil on canvas, approximately 34 inches x 61 inches (86 x 154 cm). Museo e Gallerie Nazionali de Capodimonte, Naples. Some Background: Hieronymus Bosch previously painted the parable of the blind with two beggars; Cornelis Massys with four beggars. Brueghel chose to paint six beggars. His beggars' faces show an unusual intensity, strongest in the beggar about to lose his balance. All beggars are blind, but their individuality is startling. Indeed, some art critics have stated that our own view of blindness originated from Brueghel's paintings, a number of which depict blind people. The background contains the church, a strong building pointing towards the sky. Click on the image to see an enlarged version.

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Information Cascades and Rational Herding:
An Annotated Bibliography and Resource Reference

Available at www.info-cascades.info

Sushil Bikhchandani
David Hirshleifer
Ivo Welch

ivo_welch@brown.edu

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October 2007 NOTICE:

With the exception of this part, this web page has not been updated since 2004. It will become a Wiki shortly to allow more intelligent collaborative editing and to resume updating. Please check back over the next few months. This web page should be improving.

Some quick observations as to the impact of information cascades. As of October 2007:

• There were about 2,100 hits in google scholar that contain the consecutive word combination informational cascades. (There are also about 600 cites of the same query omitting the final "s". Most are probably overlapping.) (You should exclude articles containing the word "yeast" literature, because the same term has been used there, too.)

  About 1,181 of these cite the original article, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades itself.

• Web of Science finds about 433 cites for the original article. The graph of citations in each year shows that 2006 had the highest annual cite count (of 60).

Of course, be very cautious in interpreting these statistics. They are not particularly good at anything. They are only mildly indicative. (Anyone who trusts that the google or webofscience simple cite counts have much meaning should get their head checked.) My plan is to create better statistics, at citation.info in about 2-3 years.

To me, the most interesting aspect is that a number of these cites appear in non-economics journals---biology, political science, sociology, marketing, and elsewhere. If you are working in a non-economics academic discipline, and you would like to learn more information from us, feel free to contact us. We will try to help if we can.

The New York Times John Tierney also just posted a nice writeup (October 8, 2007), which is what prompted me to accelerate my restart of a long-intended revision of this page.

Here is the Palgrave Dictionary entry on Information Cascades (joint with [and mostly written by] Sushil Bikhchandani and David Hirshleifer), 2006

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Introduction and Purpose

These Web pages are an attempt to help coordinate information and permit interaction among authors interested in the informational cascades and rational herding literature. The intention of this WWW page is to (eventually) be comprehensive. This is quite an undertaking, especially at the boundaries where it is not clear whether a paper should be included or not. (Eventually, we hope to write a survey article of relevant literature for publication in a standard economics journal, but this is still a while away.) Moreover, this is both an early draft and a "living" document which is constantly changing. We would like your help to update and improve it. Please be forgiving: in its current state, it is sketchy, subjective, and includes background information not suitable for formal publication. Naturally, this page also reflects some of the authors' biases. If you feel that work has been misrepresented, we would like to hear from you. We are especially interested in corrections, additions, new references, email addresses to authors not yet hot-linked, etc.

If you want to suggest the inclusion of additional papers, please send an email to ivo welch and request a password to edit this page when it becomes a wiki (web-collaborative document). State your research affiliation, please---this page is not for commercial linking, but for university-level research---and include a link in the email to at least one cascades-related paper or page.

In the references that will follow, within each category, we mostly present papers in alphabetical order of the first author's last name, although we have also sometimes added papers at the end out of convenience. Because this file is HTML, it can be searched, printed, downloaded, etc. Email contact addresses (where available) have been added as hyperlinks, either via an obvious icon or via a link in the author's name. The bibliography is also accessible in BiBTeX format, and there is a separate author listing.

If this WWW page has helped you, please cite it:

Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. June 1996. Information Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography. Working Paper: UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University and Yale/SOM (Note: The World-Wide Web)

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A Quick Introduction to Information Cascades

Intuition and Aspects

A Simple Example: Let us presume that you and a lot of other people have to find your way to a new destination, and you come to a crossway where you can only either go left or right. Everyone has a private imperfect signal (call it "judgment" or "opinion"). For simplicity, let everyone have a private signal "left" ("right") with probability 2/3 if the true best choice is to go left (right). So, the signal helps but it is not perfect. Everyone's signal is equally good.

Now, assume that you are the third person to choose, and you first saw a man and then a woman go left. I claim that it is optimal for you to go "left" even if your private signal/intuition says "right". Why? You know that the man must have had an "l" signal, because he went left. The woman saw the man go "left." She would have figured out that the first individual's signal was "left". If her private signal was "left", she would have surely walked left, too. If her signal was "right", she would have been aware of one right and one left signal. She might have walked either way.

Now it is your turn. Having seen both the man and the woman walk "left," you know that the man had a "left" signal and the woman had a better than even chance of having had a "left" signal. Loosely speaking, the actions of your predecessors give you more than 1 "left" signal. Even if your private information is 1 "right" signal, net-in-net you should choose "left" if you are acting rationally---and so will everyone choosing after you. Now, everyone after you will know that what you did had nothing to do with your private information---but they will be in the same boat. The optimal decision will be to do the same thing and go left. One major consequence of information cascades is that you may get a million rational individuals walking "left" just because the first two individuals walked "left", even if the true best choice was "right." (This will happen with more than 1/3*1/3=1/9 probability [first two individuals got incorrect "left" signals].)

So, what does this mean for society? Cascades predict that you can get massive social imitation, occasionally leading everyone (the "herd") to the incorrect choice. (Because everyone knows that there is very little information in a cascade, cascades are "fragile"; a little bit of new public information can make a big difference).

Definition: An information cascade is a situation in which every subsequent actor, based on the observations of others, makes the same choice independent of his/her private signal.

Erroneous Mass Behavior: In an information cascades everyone is individually acting rationally. Still, even if all participants as a collective have overwhelming information in favor of the correct action, each and every participant may take the wrong action. The probability that everyone is taking the wrong action is less than 50%, but it is easy to construct examples in which everyone is wrong with 30-40% probability.

Fragility: A little bit of public information (or an unusual signal) can overturn a long-standing informational cascades. That is, even though a million people may have chosen one action, seemingly little information can induce the next million people to choose the opposite action. Fragility is an integral component of the Informational cascades theory!

Overviews and Surveys

There are other intuitive explanations and/or similar surveys in:

• Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. Summer 1998. Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12:3, 151-170 An overview and classification of work on herding and informational cascades.
• Andrea Devenow, Ivo Welch. April 1996. Rational Herding in Financial Economics. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 603-615 A Survey of Work on Rational Herding in Finance.
• Douglas Gale. April 1996. What Have We Learned From Social Learning?. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 617-628
• Simon Grant, Stephen King, Ben Polak. March 1996. Information Externalities, Share-priced Based Incentives and Managerial Behavior. Journal of Economic Surveys 10:1, 1-21
• David Hirshleifer. 1995. The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads and lnformational Cascades. Publisher: Cambridge University Pressin The New Economics of Human Behaviour ed by Kathryn Ieurulli and Mariano Tommasi 188-215 A simple explanation of Informational Cascades.
• Ivo Welch. 1999. Imitation and Conformity . Working Paper: Yale/SOM A very early draft of an attempt to write a summary of informationalcascades for a popular scientific magazine (ala Scientific American or Discover magazine).
• David Hirshleifer. 1998. ''Information Cascades and Social Conventions,'' in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.

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The Academic Literature

Origin

Information Cascades first appeared in the following three papers:

• Abhijit V. Banerjee. August 1992. A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:3, 797-818
• Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. October 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100:5, 992-1026
• Ivo Welch. June 1992. Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades. Journal of Finance 47:2, 695-732

The first drafts of Banerjee (1992) and Welch (1992) were both independent and contemporaneous. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) independently show in different settings that information cascades (or "herding", in Banerjee's terminology) will eventually occur with certainty. (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch generalized a result in Welch (1992).) Welch (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) assume discrete actions. Banerjee (1992) assumes continuous actions, but discontinuous preferences. Bikhchandhani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) prove the generality of information cascades, their fragility, and discuss their applications. Welch (1992) examines the pricing of common-value goods (such as shares in Initial Public Offerings [IPOs] of stock) by a seller when purchasers cascade; it also examines the effect of price-setting by an informed seller.

Direct Methodological Extensions/Improvements

Although the papers in this section may offer models outside the cascades realm as well, at least one part of the following papers offers an analysis of information cascades under assumptions different from those in the original papers.

The literature tells us that the two crucial ingredients of an information cascades model are: [1] sequential decisions with subsequent actors observing decisions (not information) of previous actors; and [2] a limited action space (e.g., an adopt/reject decision). Assumptions that are mostly technical, in that cascades are robust to their (possibly gradual) relaxation are: [3] private information that is bounded and imperfectly informative; [4] homogeneity of actors; [5] constant cost of adoption; [6] exogenous ordering. While relaxation of [3-5] generally decreases the speed with which cascades form, relaxation of [6] can increase the speed.

• Christopher Avery, Peter Zemsky. 1998. Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets. American Economic Review 88:4, @@Fixit When the cost of adoption varies, as in a market pricing context, multiple sources of uncertainty are required to produce information cascades. Forthcoming, AER. (asked pierre for email)
• Christophe Chamley, Douglas Gale. 1994. Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment. Econometrica 62:5, 1065-1085 Decision-makers can choose their position in the line.
• Chong Ju Choi, Xeni Dassiou, Stephen Gettings. May 1996. Herding Behavior and the Size of Customer Base as a Commitment to Quality. Working Paper: City University Business School Frobisher Crescent, Barbican Centre, London EC2Y 8HB, England, and City University/London, and Queens College/Oxford Individuals do not know where they are in the line. Presence of product maymean a negative cascade. With large enough a customer base, even the firstconsumer might cascade. (Higher-quality producers may signal by choosing anunusually large customer base.)
• Simon Gervais. November 1995. Market Microstructure With Uncertain Information Precision: A Multi-Period Analysis. Working Paper: University of California/Berkeley Shows that trade processes can be stuck in a cascade, and some informationis thus never aggregated into market prices.
• Faruk Gul, Russell Lundholm. 1995. Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions. Journal of Political Economy 103:5, 1039-1066 Endogenous timing leads agents with most extreme information to move first. Continuous time model permits perfect information aggregation. (EMAIL of Gul? )
• In Ho Lee. December 1993. On the Convergence of Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Theory 61:2, 395-411 Necessary and sufficient conditions for information cascades.
• Susanne Lohmann. February 1994. Rationality, Revolution and Revolt: The (Hap-) Hazards of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Political Science, UCLA Heterogeneity in private values induces the difference inexpected vs. actual participation to drive cascade behavior.
  Note: Susanne Lohman is currently writing a political science book on information cascades. For an empirical application, see her second paper described below.
• Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel. September 1997. Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids. Working Paper: Boston University and University of Vienna Sequential Sales and Cascades. Includes a winner's curse.
• Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago Agents receive multiple signals (each period) and make multiple choices.
• Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1995. Pathological Models of Observational Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT My draft is very early and difficult to understand. (Sorenson EMAIL: ? ?)
• Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1997. Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation. Working Paper: MIT, Economics Department and Nuffield College/Oxford University
• Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. July 1994. An Example of Non-Martingale Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT My draft is very early and difficult to understand.
• Jianbo Zhang. Spring 1997. Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades. Rand Journal of Economics 28:1, 188-205 Necessary and sufficient conditions for informational cascades. Previously titled "On the Economics of Chain Reactions."

Applications

Theoretical Applications

• Venkatesh Bala, Sanjeev Goyal. July 1998. Learning from Neighbors. Review of Economic Studies 65:3, @@FIXIT Explores the impact of social structure (multi-dimensional links) on informational externalities.
• Ann M. Bell. November 1994. Dynamically Interdependent Preferences in a General Equilibrium Environment. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison Bandwagon effects and individual preferences determine prices in amulti-dimensional interactions. Depending on production function, localbandwagon effects arise. (EMAIL? , ?)
• Roberto Burguet, Xavier Vives. July 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain Conditions on costly information acquisition that allow/prevent cascades.
• Antonio Bernardo, Ivo Welch. fall 2001. On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10:3, 301-330
• Walid Busaba. 1996. IPO something. Working Paper: University of Arizona Exogenous parameters determine whether pre-selling (alaBenveniste and Spindt) or cascade-selling (ala Welch) is preferred by IPOissuers.
• Ramon Caminal, Xavier Vives. June 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain Price Dynamics in a duopoly, in which consumers learn a qualitydifferential. Note: Relates more to Vives' work on slow convergence than cascades.
• Yehning Chen. 1995a. Bank Runs: Panic of Efficient Monitoring. Working Paper: UCLA (Email? ?)
• Yehning Chen. 1995b. Banking Panics: the role of the first-come, first-served rule and informational externalities. Working Paper: UCLA See press anecdotal evidence below.. (Email? ?)
• Howard M. Corb. 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University (Email? ?)
• Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Cascading. Review of Financial Studies 11:3, 559-596 Competing firms' managers acquire information both fromsignals and each other's actions. Optimal contracts that solve theprincipal-agent problems may not solve the herding problem. (Email? ?)
• Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Herding. Working Paper: Michigan State University and Northwestern University Low pay-for-performance contracts lead to more herding.
• Naveen Khanna, Steve L. Slezak. September 1994. The Effect of Organizational Form on Information Aggregation and Project Choice: The Problem of Informational Cascades in Teams. Working Paper: Michigan State University and University of Michigan Hierarchies unlike teams do not suffer from theinformation cascades information aggregation breakdown. (Email? ?)
• Stephen P. King. February 1992. Shopping in Herds: Free-Rider Equilibria in a Search Game. Working Paper: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia When agents can observe actions (but not prices paid) by searchers, the first searcher starts an information cascade for all other agents.
• In Ho Lee. February 1992. Market Crashes and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UCLA An extension of cascades to variable price models.
• M. Moscarini, M Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1997. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory UNKNOWN, ?
• S.H. Oda, K. Miura, Kanji Ueda, Yasunori Baba. August 1996. The application of cellular automata to Network Externalities in Consumers' Theory: A Generalization of Life Game. Working Paper: Japan Consumers imitate on a two-dimensional grid. Network and information externalitiescause contagion.
• Marco Ottaviani. October 1995. Monopoly Pricing with Social Learning. Working Paper: MIT Economics Dept Analyzes optimal dynamic pricing by a monopolist whenconsumers learn from each other about quality. (Monopolist does not know ownquality.)
• Matt Ridley. 1996. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. Publisher: Viking/Penguin Books 375 Hudson Street, NY NY 10014 has a 3 page discussion of Information Cascades on p 182ff.
• Robert J. Shiller. December 1995. Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior. American Economic Review 85:2, 181-185 Discusses the contrast between observing actions of and conversing withearlier decision makers. Conversation has been analyzed by anthropologistsand social psychologists working on cognition.
• Gerald Simons, Gautam Bhattacharya. December 1994. Price Competition, Quality Choice and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Kanses Lawrence, Kansas 66045, (913) 864-3501 Consumer inference about quality can spill over from one good toanother year driving high-quality producers out of business.
• Stephen D. Smith, Larry D. Wall. January 1992. Financial Panics, Bank Failures, and the Role of Regulatory Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review @FIXIT, 1-11 Mentions information cascades as a factor in bank runs.
• Nikolaos Vettas. June 1995. Demand and Supply in New Markets: Diffusion with Bilateral Learning. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University
• Nikolaos Vettas. March 1995. On the Informational Role of Quantities: Durable Goods and Consumers' word of mouth. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University Analyzes optimal dynamic pricing by a monopolist whenconsumers learn from each other about quality. Monopolist knows ownquality.
• Jianbo Zhang, Zhentang Zhang. August 1994. Information and Payoff Externality in an Oligopoly Market. Working Paper: University of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas 66045 Asymptotic Efficiency of Oligopolistic Market with IncompleteDemand Information.

Laboratory Experiments

Please note that there is a better and more up-to-date bibliography available at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/cascy2k.htm.

• Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. July 1996. Information Cascades in the Laboratory. American Economic Review 87:5, 847-862 An experiment whether individuals ignore their private information, so that an information cascade can start. An examination of the behavior of subsequent individuals whensome individuals act irrationally.

Empirical Work

Papers Citing Information Cascades

The following paper's authors considered information cascade to be relevant enough to cite at least one of the three original cascades papers. This relieves us of having to judge ourselves whether the paper is relevant.The quoted papers need not find that information cascades is a dominant factor or may even reject the presence of information cascades. It is important in our opinion to understand whenmodels fit and when they fail. More than one cite indicates more than casual concern with informational copying/imitation/herding/cascading.

• Shigeru Asaba, Marvin B. Lieberman. 1997. Market Share Instability and Size Similarity. Some Evidence of Behavioral Similarity Among Japanese Firms. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM (Note: WP Strategy Area, 97-21) Competing Japanese industrial firms tend to adopt similar behavior. Shigeru Asaba. December 1997. Behavioral Similarity and Its Impact on Industrial Organization in Japan. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM Explores Behavioral Similarity Among Japanese Firms
• Howard M. Corb. February 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
• Stephen P. D'Arcy, Pyungsuk Oh. September 1997. The Cascade Effect in Insurance Pricing. Journal of Risk and Insurance 64:3, 465-480 Lloyd's of Londonbrokers solicitunderwriters sequentially, with each accepting underwriter signingon the same sheet of paper. Finds underpricing, but also underperformance.
• Arthur DeVany, W. David Walls. September 1994. Information, Adaptive Contracting, and Distributional Dynamics: Bose-Einstein Statistics and the Movies. Working Paper: Department of Economics, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine Movie audiences cascade. Note: Forthcoming in "The Economic Journal."
• Robert M. Gibson, Jacob Hoglund. July 1992. Copying and Sexual Selection. TREE 7:7, 229-232 Among lekking birds and mammals, many males locate in one place, andfemales can choose among them. Females choices tend to be uniform even inthe absence of spatial or phenotypic cues; there is some evidence of systematicmistakes in choice.
• Mark Kirkpatrick, Lee Alan Dugatkin. 1994. Sexual Selection and the Evolutionary Effects of Copying Mate Choice. Behavioral Evolutionary Sociobiology 34, 443-449 Provides models of one-to-one copying and mass-copying (similar to cascades).The latter often results in "run-away" trait coevolution.
• John R. Graham. 1999. Herding Among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 54:1, 237-268 Finds that newsletter analysts herd on Value Line'srecommendations. Herding strength varies with reputation, ability, signalcorrelation, past market trends and uncertainty.
• Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, Russ Wermers. December 1996. Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior. American Economic Review 85:5, 1088-1105 Mutual funds follow the same (momentum) investment strategy.Funds tended to buy/sell stocks at the same time.
• Ward A. Hanson, Daniel S. Putler. 1996. Hits and Misses: Herd Behavior and Online Product Popularity. Marketing Letters 7:4, 297-305 Runs an experiment on aol. Records software download choicesas a function of previous (manipulated) downloads.
• Kahan, UoC Law School.
  Argues that crime has an imitation component. Implications oneffective policies (curfews) and less effective policies (high prosecution,creating the impression of much crime).
• Robert E. Kennedy. November 1997. Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime Time Television Programming. Working Paper: Harvard Business School Shows that networks introduce shows in herd like fashion, andnot based on relative strategic positioning (niches).
• Daniel B. Klein. 1994. If government is so villainous, how come government officials don't seem like villains?. Economics and Philosophy 10, 91-106 Organization men adopt the cultural values of their surroundings. There are interesting related papers on norms, not directly based on but related to information cascades:
• Timur Kuran. @@FIXIT. Private Truths, Public Lies. Working Paper: @@FIXIT Timur Kuran has a new paper.
• Daniel B. Klein, John Majewski. 1996. Plank Road Fever as Informational Cascade: The Importance of Revelation. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UC/Irvine Over 10,000 miles of wooden roads were build before the Civil War in a 5year period, sequentially by different communities. An incorrect cascade?
• Laura E. Kodres, Matthew Pritsker. October 1995. Directionally Similar Position Taking and Herding by Large Futures Market Participants. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Herding is one determinant (among others) in institutions'
• Roger D. Lagunoff, Stacey L. Schreft. October 1997. A Model of Financial Fragility. Working Paper: Georgetown University and FRB of Kansas City
• Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1992. The Impact of Institutional Trading on Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32:1, 23-44
• Susanne Lohmann. October 1994. The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics 47, 42-101 Cascade participation in demonstrations against the SED regimeaggregated information about discontent. Susanne Lohmann. 1999. I Know You Know She Knows We Know You Know They Know: Common Knowledge and the Unpredictability of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, ed. Diana Richards, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming. Susanne Lohmann. 1998. Dynamics of Informational Cascades: Mass Action, the East German Revolution, and German Reunification,. Mathematical Social Sciences 35, 78-79
• Andreas Oehler. January 1996. Do Mutual Funds Specializing in German Stocks Herd?. Working Paper: Universitaet Bamberg German mutual funds tend to follow one another.
• Raghuram G. Rajan. 1994. Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 436, 399-442
• Robert J. Shiller. April 1996. Why do people dislike inflation. Working Paper: NBER #5539
• Robert J. Shiller. September 1997. Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System. Working Paper: yale university
• Ingo Schlupp, Michael J. Ryan. 1996. Male Sailfin Mollies (Poecilia latipinna) copy the mate choice of other males. Behavioral Ecology @FIXIT, forthcoming Not only female mollies copy other female males (see Schlupp, Marler, Ryan), but male mollies copy other male mollies. The attempt to discriminate between asearch/cost-based and an information cascades explanation may be misleading.
• Cass Sunstein. 1996. Social Norms and Social Roles. Columbia Law Review 18, @@FIXIT
• Ivo Welch. November 2000. Herding Among Security Analysts. Journal of Financial Economics ?, ? Evidence of sequential influence of analysts' buy/sell recommendations;stronger when markets are bullish; not necessarily information driven.
• Russ Wermers. April 1999. Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices. Journal of Finance ?, ? Investigates the behavior of institutional investors.
• Leon Zurawicki. 1997. Fashion and Fancy in Direct Foreign Investment. Journal of International Investment 1:1, @@FIXIT (Note: author is from U Mass/Boston)

Papers Admitting an Information Cascades Interpretation

A good number of papers offer empirical evidence that, in our opinion, cries out for a cascades interpretation as a partial explanatory theory. Many papers in this category precede the information cascades literature. Such papers are indicated with a . Further, some papers/examples were themselves prominently cited by information cascades papers (indicated with a papername). While this does not mean that the authors of the original studies agree with the interpretation of the work, it means that authors of followup papers felt comfortable enough to have a referee see their interpretation of this work.

• Salomon E. Asch. 1952. Social Psychology. Publisher: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ bhw
  Morton Deutsch, Harold B. Gerard. November 1955. A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51, 629-636
  Asch's famous experiments of subjects judging lengths ofsticks. Seeing other participants make obvious mistakes, subjects oftenalso copy the mistake. Interpreted as informational by Deutsch and Gerard.
• Stephen C. Ainley, Gaylene Becker, Lerita M. Coleman. 1986. The Dilemma of Difference: A Multidisciplinary View of Stigma. Publisher: Plenum, New York Stigma is local and group specific, and learned by observingthe behavior of others, such as parents.
• Brian Aitken. April 1996. Have institutional Investors Destablized Emerging Markets?. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund Sharp Increases in Autocorrelation (Bubble-like booms andbusts) in emerging financial markets' stock returns. Perhaps driven byimitation among international institutional investors.
• Larry M. Bartels. 1988. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Publisher: Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ Discusses the influence of earlier votes on voting decisions.
• Mark Fey. September 1997. Informational Cascades and Sequential Voting. Working Paper: Department of Politics, Princeton University, and Wallis Instititute of Political Economy, Rochester Alternative Email:
• Ronald S. Burt. May 1987. Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion vs. Structural Equivalence. American Journal of Sociology 92, 1287-1335 Adoption of Tetracycline in 1950's midwest is driven more byadoption by peers (equivalent doctors) than by conversation with experts.
• Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence: Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins, 3rd edition klein Chapter 4 on "social proof" describes information-based factors. (See also below.)
• Shubham Chaudhuri, Angela Chang, Jith Jayaratne. 1997. Informational Externalities and the Branch Location Decisions of Banks: An Empirical Analysis. Working Paper: Columbia University and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Banks locate new branches close to their competitors' branchesafter controlling for expected profitability. ().
• Timothy G. Conley, Timothy G. Conley. July 2000. Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Working Paper: Northwestern University and Yale University Explicitly considers who talks to who!
• Robert Forsythe, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, Robert Weber. November 1991. An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Working Paper: Northwestern University Experimental evidence on the influence of polls on electionresults. Precedes information cascades. . (Note: Susan Herbst in Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling has Shaped American Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1993) describes how individuals (both historically and currently) are concerned that polls produce a bandwagon effect. This is also evident in the cartoon by Hy Ruchlis with Sandra Oddo Clear Thinking: A Practical Introduction.)
• Peter M. Garber. 1990. Famous First Bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4-2, 35-54 Classic paper on Rationality of Seemingly Irrational Behavior.
• Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, Jose A. Scheinkman. May 1996. Crime and Social Interactions. Quarterly Journal of Economics @@FIXIT, 507-548 Documents high variance of criminal activity across time andspace. Develops a methodology to empirically test for degree ofinterrelatedness in actions on a spatial grid, after controlling for socialfactors. Finds high degree of interrelatedness for certain crimes.
• Ingo Schlupp, Cathy Marler, Michael J. Ryan. January 1994. Benefit to Male Sailfin Mollies of Mating with Heterospecific Females. Science 263, 373-374 Female sailfin mollies prefer those sailfin males they seemating with Amazon mollies. Male sailfin mollies therefore mate with adifferent mollies species (Amazon mollies) to induce their own species'females to imitate.
• An empirical investigation into cascades in medical treatments.
  Charles Phelps. summer 1992. Diffusion of Information in Medical Care. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:3, 23-42
  Discusses the presence of persistent localized variations inmedical treatments.

Some information cascades papers quote a number of earlier papers' empirical evidence as examples that can be reinterpreted as information cascades. (We hope the authors will forgive us.)

• Biology: bhw Galef (1976), bhw Stamps (1988), bhwPersson (1971), bhwKiester and Slatkin (1974), bhwPomianski (1990), bhwGibson, Bradbury, and Vehrencamp (1991), bhwWade and Pruett-Jones (1990).
• Medical Practice: Taylor (1979), Robin (1984), Barnum (1987)
• Anthropology: Rogers (1983), Bliss (1952), Alers-Montalvo (1957), Rogers and van Es (1964). Ryan and Gross (1943).

Casual Examples

Not only did we claim in our published paper that earlier papers contained some evidence of information cascades behavior, we are now going a step further and are speculating about other examples ourselves.

• Looking into the sky quickly gets passers-by to follow.

• The Sanhedrin?

The Press

Information Cascades Featured

• Mat Bishop (Anonymous). February 1994. Yes, ten million people can be wrong. The Economist @@FIXIT, 81 We know the author! A full-page description of cascades
• Marilyn Much. March 1994. Why do Shoppers Often Behave Like Lemmings?. Investor's Business Daily @@FIXIT, 4

Information Cascades Based Soundbites

• Gary Belsky. January 1996. 7 Money Mistakes Everyone makes. Reader's Digest @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT Gary Belsky. July 1995. Why Smart People Make Major Money Mistakes. Money Magazine @@FIXIT, 76-85 Cover Story, quotes Ivo Welch in section 3, on how investorsall follow the crowd.
• Karen Pennar NY. February 1995. Why investors stampede. Business Week @@FIXIT, 84-85 Selection of reasons for herd behavior. Covers information cascades .
• Vincent J. Schodolski. February 1995. Funds' wired wallets cause shock waves in, beyond emerging markets mexico crisis highlights the hazards of "hot money". Chicago Tribune @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT Ivo Welch quoted on rationality of herds.
• Suzanne Duke, Debra Potter. April 1995. Following the stock market crowd can be expensive. Medical Economics @@FIXIT, 13 Cute illustration, incorrect conclusion.

Are there other stories in the press that you think are related to information cascades, but which do not specifically mention it? Any other anecdotes we should mention? These will not be integrated into the main text, but they will be accessible by clicking on .

Books On Imitation

• John Galbraith. 1990. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Publisher: Unknown
• Cecilia M. Heyes, Bennett G. Galef,Jr.. 1996. Social learning in animals : the roots of culture. Publisher: San Diego : Academic Press Biology: Contains a selection of chapter written by differentauthors. Chapters are related to imitation and learning via other cognitiveprocesses, such as involuntary contagious behavior (e.g., yawning).
• John M. Keynes. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Publisher: Macmillan, Londo
• Charles P. Kindleberger. 1989. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Publisher: Basic Books, New Yor
• Charles MacKay. 1841. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (original ed.), New Yor
• Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence : Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins College Publishers Chapter 4 discusses Social Proof, the influence ofinformation on decision-making, and the resulting conformity. Some of theexamples can be explained by cascades.
• Are there any books by Everett Rogers on the Diffusion of Innovations?
• Leibenstein from the 1950s.
• Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth "Die Schweigespirale."

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edit

Final Thoughts and Further Reading

1. Here, we will eventually offer links and explanations to models that are not informational cascades models. There will be at least two subsections: one on informational herding models and one on non-informational herding models. This writeup will be necessarily weak, because it is neither the focus of this survey nor are we experts in that literature. Still, the material is intrinsically related and thus relevant, and well worth reading to researchers interested in working on imitation.

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Not Yet Processed

• Christophe Chamley . 2002 . Rational Herds . Publisher: unknown
• Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Lisa Vesterlund. 2001. Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding. Working Paper: University of Pittsburgh
• Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. 2000. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Chapter on Information Cascades and Rational Conformity. Publisher: Macmillan Reference Ltd
• Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. n/a. Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes Rule. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 179-187
• Nordell SE, Valone TJ. September 1998. Mate choice copying as public information. Ecology Letters 1:2, 74-76 Paper examines a setting where individuals can benefit by copying when they cannot discriminate differences in potential mates. Paper cites cascades.
• Z Neeman, GO Orosel. March 1999. Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids. Journal Of Economic Theory 85:1, 91-121 In this paper a seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. Informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse.
• Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris. September 1998. Finance Applications of Game Theory. Working Paper: The Wharton School This paper argues that many empirical phenomena are difficult to reconcile with the traditional framework of financial theory, and suggests several directions, including informational cascades, that promise to provide further insights. Wharton School, Working Paper 98-23B
• Dean Corbea, Alejandro Manelli, Ted Temzelides. 1998. Financial Intermediation and Informational Cascades: A Mechanism Design Approach. Working Paper: Iowa State University and Arizona State University
• David Stead. ?. A General Theory of Enclosures. Working Paper: Oxford University This paper suggests that the concept of informational cascades can help explain the spatial diffusion pattern of enclosure in England.
• Singhal Deepali. December 1994. Informational Cascades and Their Application To Technology Diffusion. Working Paper: UC Santa Cruz This argues that informational cascades may be important for understanding the diffusion of new technological innovations that increase productivity enhance economic growth.
• Eugene Anderson, Jonathan Frenzen, Mary Sullivan. June 1998. The Signal Value of Others' Behavior: Informational Cascades in the Auction of the Estate of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,. Working Paper: U. Michigan Business School, University of Chicago and, U.S. Department of Justice applies informational cascades ideas to data provided by Sotheby's Auction of the estate of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis.
• Cristina Bicchieri, Y. Fukui. 1999. The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms. Business Ethics Quarterly ?, (in press) (Note: Also appearing in A. Pagnini and M.C. Galavotti (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation, Kluwer 1998.) This paper studies how unpopular norms may emerge as the result of negative informational cascades, and examines the power of small numbers of trendsetters to start a cascade that allows an unpopular norm to get established.
• Steffen Huck, Joerg Oechssler Huck. 1998. Informational Cascades with Continuous Action Spaces. Economics Letters 60, 163-166 (Note: Humboldt University, Berlin) A note providing an example of cascades with continuous action space.
• Steven R Grenadier. 1999. Information revelation through option exercise. Review Of Financial Studies 12:1, 95-129 In many situations, individuals may infer the private signals of others by observing their choice of whether to exercise an option, such as the building of an office building, the drilling of an exploratory oil well, and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug. This paper examines cascades in the exercise of real options.
• David Hirshleifer. 1998. Informational Cascades and Social Conventions. Publisher: Palgravein The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law
• David Hirshleifer, Robert Noah. 1999. Misfits and Social Progress. Working Paper: Ohio State University ...examines the effect of social misfits (newcomers, prophets and fools) on cascades and social outcomes. Related to the Bernardo/Welch paper on overconfidence and entrepeneurs.
• H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Conversation, Learning, and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University Examines conversational learning where observation of both actions and outcomes to show that that informational cascades start with certainty, leading to inefficient decisions.
• H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Observing Others Can Reduce Decision Quality: A Theory of Groupthink as a Result of Rational Individual Behavior. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University
• Timur Kuran, Cass R. Sunstein. April 1999. Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Review 51:4, 683-768 The paper defines an availability cascade as a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse. This includes informational cascades. The paper examines the effects of availability entrepreneurs-activists who manipulate the content of public discourse-strive to trigger availability cascades. The paper analyzes the relation of availability cascades to regulation of hazards and possible reforms of regulatory policy.
• Lee-Bath Nelson. 1998. Persistence and Reversal in Herd Behavior. Working Paper: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University examines extent to which cascades persist and behavior is correlated when underlying value is stochastic.
• Marco Ottaviani, Peter Sorenson. 1998. Herd Behavior and Investment: Comment. Working Paper: MIT Explores the relation between `statistical herding' (informational cascades) and reputation.
• M. Moscarini, M. Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1998. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory 11:3, 657-665 Examines cascades when underlying value of alternative actions is randomly changing through time.
• Gautam Bhattacharyya, Gerald Simons. 1996. Informational Cascades in Informal Markets. Journal of Economics ?, ?
• Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago This is macroeconomic model where long-lived individuals receive signals and choose actions each period. The underlying value evolves as a binary Markov process. Repeated arrival of information eventually causes cascades to break and reform. The paper relates such volatility of behavior to economic business cycles.
• Others:

       Comment on ``Turbulent cascades in foreign exchange markets'' 
            Authors: Alain Arneodo (1), Jean-Philippe Bouchaud (2,3), Rama 
       Cont (3,5), Jean-Francois Muzy (1), Marc
            Potters (3) and Didier Sornette (3,4,5). ((1) Centre de Recherche 
       Paul Pascal (2) CEA Saclay (3) Science &
            Finance (4) UCLA (5) Universite de Nice)
            Abstract: Ghashghaie et al(Nature, 1996) have proposed an analogy 
       between the statistical description of
            velocity increments in turbulent fluids and price fluctuations in 
       foreign exchange markets, comparing Kolmogorov's
            energy cascades to 'informational cascades' in financial markets. 
       We provide evidence showing that the two
            problems differ on an important point: while veolcity increments 
       are strongly correlated, leading to Kolmogorov's
            famous 5/3 law, price increments are almost uncorrelated and 
       exhibit a 'white noise' spectrum. 
            Comments: LaTeX, 4 pages + 2 postscript figures, Science &
       Finance Working Paper 96/01. 
       
       Daniel Sgroi: Endogenous Timing and Information Revelation in Herding 
       Models
       University of Oxford    
                  This paper looks at the addition of endogenous timing of 
       entry to cascades and herding models.  
  

• Michael J. Etzel, Bruce J. Walker, William J. Stanton. ?. MARKETING, Eleventh Edition . Publisher: McGraw Hill (Note: url="http://www.mhhe.com/business/marketing/etzel/adcurrb.html" )

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Last Compile: Mon May 31 10:16:37 2004.

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Pure Chronological List

• [107] Christophe Chamley . 2002 . Rational Herds . Publisher: unknown.
• [104] Charles MacKay. 1841. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (original ed.), New Yor.
• [102] John M. Keynes. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Publisher: Macmillan, Londo.
• [78] Salomon E. Asch. 1952. Social Psychology. Publisher: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
• [79] Morton Deutsch, Harold B. Gerard. November 1955. A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51, 629-636.
• [80] Stephen C. Ainley, Gaylene Becker, Lerita M. Coleman. 1986. The Dilemma of Difference: A Multidisciplinary View of Stigma. Publisher: Plenum, New York.
• [84] Ronald S. Burt. May 1987. Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion vs. Structural Equivalence. American Journal of Sociology 92, 1287-1335.
• [82] Larry M. Bartels. 1988. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Publisher: Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
• [103] Charles P. Kindleberger. 1989. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Publisher: Basic Books, New Yor.
• [89] Peter M. Garber. 1990. Famous First Bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4-2, 35-54.
• [100] John Galbraith. 1990. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Publisher: Unknown.
• [88] Robert Forsythe, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, Robert Weber. November 1991. An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Working Paper: Northwestern University.
• [65] Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1992. The Impact of Institutional Trading on Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32:1, 23-44.
• [92] Charles Phelps. summer 1992. Diffusion of Information in Medical Care. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:3, 23-42.
• [44] Stephen D. Smith, Larry D. Wall. January 1992. Financial Panics, Bank Failures, and the Role of Regulatory Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review @FIXIT, 1-11.
• [36] Stephen P. King. February 1992. Shopping in Herds: Free-Rider Equilibria in a Search Game. Working Paper: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia.
• [37] In Ho Lee. February 1992. Market Crashes and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UCLA.
• [10] Ivo Welch. June 1992. Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades. Journal of Finance 47:2, 695-732.
• [54] Robert M. Gibson, Jacob Hoglund. July 1992. Copying and Sexual Selection. TREE 7:7, 229-232.
• [8] Abhijit V. Banerjee. August 1992. A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:3, 797-818.
• [9] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. October 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100:5, 992-1026.
• [32] Howard M. Corb. 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University.
• [85] Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence: Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins, 3rd edition.
• [105] Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence : Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins College Publishers.
• [51] Howard M. Corb. February 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• [16] In Ho Lee. December 1993. On the Convergence of Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Theory 61:2, 395-411.
• [12] Christophe Chamley, Douglas Gale. 1994. Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment. Econometrica 62:5, 1065-1085.
• [55] Mark Kirkpatrick, Lee Alan Dugatkin. 1994. Sexual Selection and the Evolutionary Effects of Copying Mate Choice. Behavioral Evolutionary Sociobiology 34, 443-449.
• [60] Daniel B. Klein. 1994. If government is so villainous, how come government officials don't seem like villains?. Economics and Philosophy 10, 91-106.
• [70] Raghuram G. Rajan. 1994. Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 436, 399-442.
• [91] Ingo Schlupp, Cathy Marler, Michael J. Ryan. January 1994. Benefit to Male Sailfin Mollies of Mating with Heterospecific Females. Science 263, 373-374.
• [17] Susanne Lohmann. February 1994. Rationality, Revolution and Revolt: The (Hap-) Hazards of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Political Science, UCLA.
• [93] Mat Bishop (Anonymous). February 1994. Yes, ten million people can be wrong. The Economist @@FIXIT, 81.
• [94] Marilyn Much. March 1994. Why do Shoppers Often Behave Like Lemmings?. Investor's Business Daily @@FIXIT, 4.
• [22] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. July 1994. An Example of Non-Martingale Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT.
• [47] Jianbo Zhang, Zhentang Zhang. August 1994. Information and Payoff Externality in an Oligopoly Market. Working Paper: University of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas 66045.
• [35] Naveen Khanna, Steve L. Slezak. September 1994. The Effect of Organizational Form on Information Aggregation and Project Choice: The Problem of Informational Cascades in Teams. Working Paper: Michigan State University and University of Michigan.
• [53] Arthur DeVany, W. David Walls. September 1994. Information, Adaptive Contracting, and Distributional Dynamics: Bose-Einstein Statistics and the Movies. Working Paper: Department of Economics, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine.
• [66] Susanne Lohmann. October 1994. The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics 47, 42-101.
• [25] Ann M. Bell. November 1994. Dynamically Interdependent Preferences in a General Equilibrium Environment. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
• [43] Gerald Simons, Gautam Bhattacharya. December 1994. Price Competition, Quality Choice and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Kanses Lawrence, Kansas 66045, (913) 864-3501.
• [116] Singhal Deepali. December 1994. Informational Cascades and Their Application To Technology Diffusion. Working Paper: UC Santa Cruz.
• [6] David Hirshleifer. 1995. The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads and lnformational Cascades. Publisher: Cambridge University Pressin The New Economics of Human Behaviour ed by Kathryn Ieurulli and Mariano Tommasi 188-215.
• [15] Faruk Gul, Russell Lundholm. 1995. Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions. Journal of Political Economy 103:5, 1039-1066.
• [97] Karen Pennar NY. February 1995. Why investors stampede. Business Week @@FIXIT, 84-85.
• [98] Vincent J. Schodolski. February 1995. Funds' wired wallets cause shock waves in, beyond emerging markets mexico crisis highlights the hazards of "hot money". Chicago Tribune @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT.
• [46] Nikolaos Vettas. March 1995. On the Informational Role of Quantities: Durable Goods and Consumers' word of mouth. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
• [99] Suzanne Duke, Debra Potter. April 1995. Following the stock market crowd can be expensive. Medical Economics @@FIXIT, 13.
• [45] Nikolaos Vettas. June 1995. Demand and Supply in New Markets: Diffusion with Bilateral Learning. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
• [96] Gary Belsky. July 1995. Why Smart People Make Major Money Mistakes. Money Magazine @@FIXIT, 76-85.
• [20] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1995. Pathological Models of Observational Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT.
• [40] Marco Ottaviani. October 1995. Monopoly Pricing with Social Learning. Working Paper: MIT Economics Dept.
• [63] Laura E. Kodres, Matthew Pritsker. October 1995. Directionally Similar Position Taking and Herding by Large Futures Market Participants. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• [14] Simon Gervais. November 1995. Market Microstructure With Uncertain Information Precision: A Multi-Period Analysis. Working Paper: University of California/Berkeley.
• [42] Robert J. Shiller. December 1995. Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior. American Economic Review 85:2, 181-185.
• [30] Yehning Chen. 1995a. Bank Runs: Panic of Efficient Monitoring. Working Paper: UCLA.
• [31] Yehning Chen. 1995b. Banking Panics: the role of the first-come, first-served rule and informational externalities. Working Paper: UCLA.
• [19] Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago.
• [28] Walid Busaba. 1996. IPO something. Working Paper: University of Arizona.
• [41] Matt Ridley. 1996. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. Publisher: Viking/Penguin Books 375 Hudson Street, NY NY 10014.
• [58] Ward A. Hanson, Daniel S. Putler. 1996. Hits and Misses: Herd Behavior and Online Product Popularity. Marketing Letters 7:4, 297-305.
• [62] Daniel B. Klein, John Majewski. 1996. Plank Road Fever as Informational Cascade: The Importance of Revelation. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UC/Irvine.
• [73] Ingo Schlupp, Michael J. Ryan. 1996. Male Sailfin Mollies (Poecilia latipinna) copy the mate choice of other males. Behavioral Ecology @FIXIT, forthcoming.
• [74] Cass Sunstein. 1996. Social Norms and Social Roles. Columbia Law Review 18, @@FIXIT.
• [101] Cecilia M. Heyes, Bennett G. Galef,Jr.. 1996. Social learning in animals : the roots of culture. Publisher: San Diego : Academic Press.
• [129] Gautam Bhattacharyya, Gerald Simons. 1996. Informational Cascades in Informal Markets. Journal of Economics ?, ?.
• [130] Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago.
• [69] Andreas Oehler. January 1996. Do Mutual Funds Specializing in German Stocks Herd?. Working Paper: Universitaet Bamberg.
• [95] Gary Belsky. January 1996. 7 Money Mistakes Everyone makes. Reader's Digest @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT.
• [5] Simon Grant, Stephen King, Ben Polak. March 1996. Information Externalities, Share-priced Based Incentives and Managerial Behavior. Journal of Economic Surveys 10:1, 1-21.
• [3] Andrea Devenow, Ivo Welch. April 1996. Rational Herding in Financial Economics. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 603-615.
• [4] Douglas Gale. April 1996. What Have We Learned From Social Learning?. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 617-628.
• [71] Robert J. Shiller. April 1996. Why do people dislike inflation. Working Paper: NBER #5539.
• [81] Brian Aitken. April 1996. Have institutional Investors Destablized Emerging Markets?. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund.
• [13] Chong Ju Choi, Xeni Dassiou, Stephen Gettings. May 1996. Herding Behavior and the Size of Customer Base as a Commitment to Quality. Working Paper: City University Business School Frobisher Crescent, Barbican Centre, London EC2Y 8HB, England, and City University/London, and Queens College/Oxford.
• [90] Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, Jose A. Scheinkman. May 1996. Crime and Social Interactions. Quarterly Journal of Economics @@FIXIT, 507-548.
• [1] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. June 1996. Informational Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography. Working Paper: UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University and Yale/SOM (Note: The World-Wide Web).
• [48] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. July 1996. Information Cascades in the Laboratory. American Economic Review 87:5, 847-862.
• [39] S.H. Oda, K. Miura, Kanji Ueda, Yasunori Baba. August 1996. The application of cellular automata to Network Externalities in Consumers' Theory: A Generalization of Life Game. Working Paper: Japan.
• [57] Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, Russ Wermers. December 1996. Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior. American Economic Review 85:5, 1088-1105.
• [38] M. Moscarini, M Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1997. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory UNKNOWN, ?.
• [49] Shigeru Asaba, Marvin B. Lieberman. 1997. Market Share Instability and Size Similarity. Some Evidence of Behavioral Similarity Among Japanese Firms. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM (Note: WP Strategy Area, 97-21).
• [77] Leon Zurawicki. 1997. Fashion and Fancy in Direct Foreign Investment. Journal of International Investment 1:1, @@FIXIT (Note: author is from U Mass/Boston).
• [86] Shubham Chaudhuri, Angela Chang, Jith Jayaratne. 1997. Informational Externalities and the Branch Location Decisions of Banks: An Empirical Analysis. Working Paper: Columbia University and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
• [33] Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Cascading. Review of Financial Studies 11:3, 559-596.
• [34] Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Herding. Working Paper: Michigan State University and Northwestern University.
• [23] Jianbo Zhang. Spring 1997. Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades. Rand Journal of Economics 28:1, 188-205.
• [29] Ramon Caminal, Xavier Vives. June 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain.
• [26] Roberto Burguet, Xavier Vives. July 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain.
• [18] Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel. September 1997. Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids. Working Paper: Boston University and University of Vienna.
• [52] Stephen P. D'Arcy, Pyungsuk Oh. September 1997. The Cascade Effect in Insurance Pricing. Journal of Risk and Insurance 64:3, 465-480.
• [72] Robert J. Shiller. September 1997. Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System. Working Paper: yale university.
• [83] Mark Fey. September 1997. Informational Cascades and Sequential Voting. Working Paper: Department of Politics, Princeton University, and Wallis Instititute of Political Economy, Rochester.
• [21] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1997. Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation. Working Paper: MIT, Economics Department and Nuffield College/Oxford University.
• [64] Roger D. Lagunoff, Stacey L. Schreft. October 1997. A Model of Financial Fragility. Working Paper: Georgetown University and FRB of Kansas City.
• [59] Robert E. Kennedy. November 1997. Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime Time Television Programming. Working Paper: Harvard Business School.
• [50] Shigeru Asaba. December 1997. Behavioral Similarity and Its Impact on Industrial Organization in Japan. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM.
• [11] Christopher Avery, Peter Zemsky. 1998. Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets. American Economic Review 88:4, @@Fixit.
• [68] Susanne Lohmann. 1998. Dynamics of Informational Cascades: Mass Action, the East German Revolution, and German Reunification,. Mathematical Social Sciences 35, 78-79.
• [114] Dean Corbea, Alejandro Manelli, Ted Temzelides. 1998. Financial Intermediation and Informational Cascades: A Mechanism Design Approach. Working Paper: Iowa State University and Arizona State University.
• [119] Steffen Huck, Joerg Oechssler Huck. 1998. Informational Cascades with Continuous Action Spaces. Economics Letters 60, 163-166 (Note: Humboldt University, Berlin).
• [121] David Hirshleifer. 1998. Informational Cascades and Social Conventions. Publisher: Palgravein The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.
• [126] Lee-Bath Nelson. 1998. Persistence and Reversal in Herd Behavior. Working Paper: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
• [127] Marco Ottaviani, Peter Sorenson. 1998. Herd Behavior and Investment: Comment. Working Paper: MIT.
• [128] M. Moscarini, M. Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1998. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory 11:3, 657-665.
• [2] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. Summer 1998. Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12:3, 151-170.
• [117] Eugene Anderson, Jonathan Frenzen, Mary Sullivan. June 1998. The Signal Value of Others' Behavior: Informational Cascades in the Auction of the Estate of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,. Working Paper: U. Michigan Business School, University of Chicago and, U.S. Department of Justice.
• [24] Venkatesh Bala, Sanjeev Goyal. July 1998. Learning from Neighbors. Review of Economic Studies 65:3, @@FIXIT.
• [111] Nordell SE, Valone TJ. September 1998. Mate choice copying as public information. Ecology Letters 1:2, 74-76.
• [113] Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris. September 1998. Finance Applications of Game Theory. Working Paper: The Wharton School.
• [7] Ivo Welch. 1999. Imitation and Conformity . Working Paper: Yale/SOM.
• [56] John R. Graham. 1999. Herding Among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 54:1, 237-268.
• [67] Susanne Lohmann. 1999. I Know You Know She Knows We Know You Know They Know: Common Knowledge and the Unpredictability of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, ed. Diana Richards, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming..
• [118] Cristina Bicchieri, Y. Fukui. 1999. The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms. Business Ethics Quarterly ?, (in press) (Note: Also appearing in A. Pagnini and M.C. Galavotti (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation, Kluwer 1998.).
• [120] Steven R Grenadier. 1999. Information revelation through option exercise. Review Of Financial Studies 12:1, 95-129.
• [122] David Hirshleifer, Robert Noah. 1999. Misfits and Social Progress. Working Paper: Ohio State University.
• [123] H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Conversation, Learning, and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University.
• [124] H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Observing Others Can Reduce Decision Quality: A Theory of Groupthink as a Result of Rational Individual Behavior. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University.
• [112] Z Neeman, GO Orosel. March 1999. Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids. Journal Of Economic Theory 85:1, 91-121.
• [76] Russ Wermers. April 1999. Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices. Journal of Finance ?, ?.
• [125] Timur Kuran, Cass R. Sunstein. April 1999. Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Review 51:4, 683-768.
• [109] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. 2000. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Chapter on Information Cascades and Rational Conformity. Publisher: Macmillan Reference Ltd.
• [87] Timothy G. Conley, Timothy G. Conley. July 2000. Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Working Paper: Northwestern University and Yale University.
• [75] Ivo Welch. November 2000. Herding Among Security Analysts. Journal of Financial Economics ?, ?.
• [108] Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Lisa Vesterlund. 2001. Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding. Working Paper: University of Pittsburgh.
• [27] Antonio Bernardo, Ivo Welch. fall 2001. On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10:3, 301-330.
• [106] n/a. July 2001. Informational Cascades, Cognitive Bias, and Catastrophe Risk. Working Paper: Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago 5828 S. University Avenue, Chicago IL 60637.
• [115] David Stead. ?. A General Theory of Enclosures. Working Paper: Oxford University.
• [131] Michael J. Etzel, Bruce J. Walker, William J. Stanton. ?. MARKETING, Eleventh Edition . Publisher: McGraw Hill (Note: url="http://www.mhhe.com/business/marketing/etzel/adcurrb.html" ).
• [61] Timur Kuran. @@FIXIT. Private Truths, Public Lies. Working Paper: @@FIXIT.
• [110] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. n/a. Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes Rule. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 179-187.

Pure Alphabetical List

• [93] Mat Bishop (Anonymous). February 1994. Yes, ten million people can be wrong. The Economist @@FIXIT, 81.
• [106] n/a. July 2001. Informational Cascades, Cognitive Bias, and Catastrophe Risk. Working Paper: Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago 5828 S. University Avenue, Chicago IL 60637.
• [80] Stephen C. Ainley, Gaylene Becker, Lerita M. Coleman. 1986. The Dilemma of Difference: A Multidisciplinary View of Stigma. Publisher: Plenum, New York.
• [81] Brian Aitken. April 1996. Have institutional Investors Destablized Emerging Markets?. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund.
• [113] Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris. September 1998. Finance Applications of Game Theory. Working Paper: The Wharton School.
• [48] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. July 1996. Information Cascades in the Laboratory. American Economic Review 87:5, 847-862.
• [109] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. 2000. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Chapter on Information Cascades and Rational Conformity. Publisher: Macmillan Reference Ltd.
• [110] Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt. n/a. Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes Rule. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 179-187.
• [117] Eugene Anderson, Jonathan Frenzen, Mary Sullivan. June 1998. The Signal Value of Others' Behavior: Informational Cascades in the Auction of the Estate of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,. Working Paper: U. Michigan Business School, University of Chicago and, U.S. Department of Justice.
• [49] Shigeru Asaba, Marvin B. Lieberman. 1997. Market Share Instability and Size Similarity. Some Evidence of Behavioral Similarity Among Japanese Firms. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM (Note: WP Strategy Area, 97-21).
• [50] Shigeru Asaba. December 1997. Behavioral Similarity and Its Impact on Industrial Organization in Japan. Working Paper: UCLA, Anderson GSM.
• [78] Salomon E. Asch. 1952. Social Psychology. Publisher: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
• [11] Christopher Avery, Peter Zemsky. 1998. Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets. American Economic Review 88:4, @@Fixit.
• [24] Venkatesh Bala, Sanjeev Goyal. July 1998. Learning from Neighbors. Review of Economic Studies 65:3, @@FIXIT.
• [8] Abhijit V. Banerjee. August 1992. A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:3, 797-818.
• [82] Larry M. Bartels. 1988. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Publisher: Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
• [25] Ann M. Bell. November 1994. Dynamically Interdependent Preferences in a General Equilibrium Environment. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
• [95] Gary Belsky. January 1996. 7 Money Mistakes Everyone makes. Reader's Digest @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT.
• [96] Gary Belsky. July 1995. Why Smart People Make Major Money Mistakes. Money Magazine @@FIXIT, 76-85.
• [27] Antonio Bernardo, Ivo Welch. fall 2001. On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10:3, 301-330.
• [129] Gautam Bhattacharyya, Gerald Simons. 1996. Informational Cascades in Informal Markets. Journal of Economics ?, ?.
• [118] Cristina Bicchieri, Y. Fukui. 1999. The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms. Business Ethics Quarterly ?, (in press) (Note: Also appearing in A. Pagnini and M.C. Galavotti (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation, Kluwer 1998.).
• [1] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. June 1996. Informational Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography. Working Paper: UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University and Yale/SOM (Note: The World-Wide Web).
• [2] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. Summer 1998. Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12:3, 151-170.
• [9] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch. October 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100:5, 992-1026.
• [108] Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Lisa Vesterlund. 2001. Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding. Working Paper: University of Pittsburgh.
• [26] Roberto Burguet, Xavier Vives. July 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain.
• [84] Ronald S. Burt. May 1987. Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion vs. Structural Equivalence. American Journal of Sociology 92, 1287-1335.
• [28] Walid Busaba. 1996. IPO something. Working Paper: University of Arizona.
• [29] Ramon Caminal, Xavier Vives. June 1997. Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning. Working Paper: Institut d' Analisi Economica, CSIC 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain.
• [123] H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Conversation, Learning, and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University.
• [124] H. Henry Cao, David Hirshleifer. 1999. Observing Others Can Reduce Decision Quality: A Theory of Groupthink as a Result of Rational Individual Behavior. Working Paper: UC Berkeley and Ohio State University.
• [12] Christophe Chamley, Douglas Gale. 1994. Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment. Econometrica 62:5, 1065-1085.
• [107] Christophe Chamley . 2002 . Rational Herds . Publisher: unknown.
• [86] Shubham Chaudhuri, Angela Chang, Jith Jayaratne. 1997. Informational Externalities and the Branch Location Decisions of Banks: An Empirical Analysis. Working Paper: Columbia University and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
• [30] Yehning Chen. 1995a. Bank Runs: Panic of Efficient Monitoring. Working Paper: UCLA.
• [31] Yehning Chen. 1995b. Banking Panics: the role of the first-come, first-served rule and informational externalities. Working Paper: UCLA.
• [13] Chong Ju Choi, Xeni Dassiou, Stephen Gettings. May 1996. Herding Behavior and the Size of Customer Base as a Commitment to Quality. Working Paper: City University Business School Frobisher Crescent, Barbican Centre, London EC2Y 8HB, England, and City University/London, and Queens College/Oxford.
• [85] Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence: Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins, 3rd edition.
• [105] Robert B. Cialdini. 1993. Influence : Science and Practice. Publisher: Harper Collins College Publishers.
• [87] Timothy G. Conley, Timothy G. Conley. July 2000. Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Working Paper: Northwestern University and Yale University.
• [32] Howard M. Corb. 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University.
• [51] Howard M. Corb. February 1993. The Nature of Bank Runs. Working Paper: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• [114] Dean Corbea, Alejandro Manelli, Ted Temzelides. 1998. Financial Intermediation and Informational Cascades: A Mechanism Design Approach. Working Paper: Iowa State University and Arizona State University.
• [52] Stephen P. D'Arcy, Pyungsuk Oh. September 1997. The Cascade Effect in Insurance Pricing. Journal of Risk and Insurance 64:3, 465-480.
• [53] Arthur DeVany, W. David Walls. September 1994. Information, Adaptive Contracting, and Distributional Dynamics: Bose-Einstein Statistics and the Movies. Working Paper: Department of Economics, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine.
• [116] Singhal Deepali. December 1994. Informational Cascades and Their Application To Technology Diffusion. Working Paper: UC Santa Cruz.
• [79] Morton Deutsch, Harold B. Gerard. November 1955. A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51, 629-636.
• [3] Andrea Devenow, Ivo Welch. April 1996. Rational Herding in Financial Economics. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 603-615.
• [99] Suzanne Duke, Debra Potter. April 1995. Following the stock market crowd can be expensive. Medical Economics @@FIXIT, 13.
• [131] Michael J. Etzel, Bruce J. Walker, William J. Stanton. ?. MARKETING, Eleventh Edition . Publisher: McGraw Hill (Note: url="http://www.mhhe.com/business/marketing/etzel/adcurrb.html" ).
• [83] Mark Fey. September 1997. Informational Cascades and Sequential Voting. Working Paper: Department of Politics, Princeton University, and Wallis Instititute of Political Economy, Rochester.
• [88] Robert Forsythe, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, Robert Weber. November 1991. An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Working Paper: Northwestern University.
• [100] John Galbraith. 1990. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Publisher: Unknown.
• [4] Douglas Gale. April 1996. What Have We Learned From Social Learning?. European Economic Review 40:3-5, 617-628.
• [89] Peter M. Garber. 1990. Famous First Bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4-2, 35-54.
• [14] Simon Gervais. November 1995. Market Microstructure With Uncertain Information Precision: A Multi-Period Analysis. Working Paper: University of California/Berkeley.
• [54] Robert M. Gibson, Jacob Hoglund. July 1992. Copying and Sexual Selection. TREE 7:7, 229-232.
• [90] Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, Jose A. Scheinkman. May 1996. Crime and Social Interactions. Quarterly Journal of Economics @@FIXIT, 507-548.
• [56] John R. Graham. 1999. Herding Among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 54:1, 237-268.
• [5] Simon Grant, Stephen King, Ben Polak. March 1996. Information Externalities, Share-priced Based Incentives and Managerial Behavior. Journal of Economic Surveys 10:1, 1-21.
• [120] Steven R Grenadier. 1999. Information revelation through option exercise. Review Of Financial Studies 12:1, 95-129.
• [57] Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, Russ Wermers. December 1996. Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior. American Economic Review 85:5, 1088-1105.
• [15] Faruk Gul, Russell Lundholm. 1995. Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions. Journal of Political Economy 103:5, 1039-1066.
• [58] Ward A. Hanson, Daniel S. Putler. 1996. Hits and Misses: Herd Behavior and Online Product Popularity. Marketing Letters 7:4, 297-305.
• [101] Cecilia M. Heyes, Bennett G. Galef,Jr.. 1996. Social learning in animals : the roots of culture. Publisher: San Diego : Academic Press.
• [6] David Hirshleifer. 1995. The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads and lnformational Cascades. Publisher: Cambridge University Pressin The New Economics of Human Behaviour ed by Kathryn Ieurulli and Mariano Tommasi 188-215.
• [121] David Hirshleifer. 1998. Informational Cascades and Social Conventions. Publisher: Palgravein The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.
• [122] David Hirshleifer, Robert Noah. 1999. Misfits and Social Progress. Working Paper: Ohio State University.
• [119] Steffen Huck, Joerg Oechssler Huck. 1998. Informational Cascades with Continuous Action Spaces. Economics Letters 60, 163-166 (Note: Humboldt University, Berlin).
• [59] Robert E. Kennedy. November 1997. Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime Time Television Programming. Working Paper: Harvard Business School.
• [102] John M. Keynes. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Publisher: Macmillan, Londo.
• [33] Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Cascading. Review of Financial Studies 11:3, 559-596.
• [34] Naveen Khanna. January 1997. Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Herding. Working Paper: Michigan State University and Northwestern University.
• [35] Naveen Khanna, Steve L. Slezak. September 1994. The Effect of Organizational Form on Information Aggregation and Project Choice: The Problem of Informational Cascades in Teams. Working Paper: Michigan State University and University of Michigan.
• [103] Charles P. Kindleberger. 1989. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Publisher: Basic Books, New Yor.
• [36] Stephen P. King. February 1992. Shopping in Herds: Free-Rider Equilibria in a Search Game. Working Paper: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia.
• [55] Mark Kirkpatrick, Lee Alan Dugatkin. 1994. Sexual Selection and the Evolutionary Effects of Copying Mate Choice. Behavioral Evolutionary Sociobiology 34, 443-449.
• [60] Daniel B. Klein. 1994. If government is so villainous, how come government officials don't seem like villains?. Economics and Philosophy 10, 91-106.
• [62] Daniel B. Klein, John Majewski. 1996. Plank Road Fever as Informational Cascade: The Importance of Revelation. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UC/Irvine.
• [63] Laura E. Kodres, Matthew Pritsker. October 1995. Directionally Similar Position Taking and Herding by Large Futures Market Participants. Working Paper: International Monetary Fund and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• [61] Timur Kuran. @@FIXIT. Private Truths, Public Lies. Working Paper: @@FIXIT.
• [125] Timur Kuran, Cass R. Sunstein. April 1999. Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Review 51:4, 683-768.
• [64] Roger D. Lagunoff, Stacey L. Schreft. October 1997. A Model of Financial Fragility. Working Paper: Georgetown University and FRB of Kansas City.
• [65] Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1992. The Impact of Institutional Trading on Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32:1, 23-44.
• [16] In Ho Lee. December 1993. On the Convergence of Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Theory 61:2, 395-411.
• [37] In Ho Lee. February 1992. Market Crashes and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, UCLA.
• [17] Susanne Lohmann. February 1994. Rationality, Revolution and Revolt: The (Hap-) Hazards of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Political Science, UCLA.
• [66] Susanne Lohmann. October 1994. The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics 47, 42-101.
• [67] Susanne Lohmann. 1999. I Know You Know She Knows We Know You Know They Know: Common Knowledge and the Unpredictability of Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, ed. Diana Richards, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming..
• [68] Susanne Lohmann. 1998. Dynamics of Informational Cascades: Mass Action, the East German Revolution, and German Reunification,. Mathematical Social Sciences 35, 78-79.
• [104] Charles MacKay. 1841. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (original ed.), New Yor.
• [38] M. Moscarini, M Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1997. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory UNKNOWN, ?.
• [128] M. Moscarini, M. Ottaviani, L. Smith. 1998. Social Learning in a Changing World. Economic Theory 11:3, 657-665.
• [94] Marilyn Much. March 1994. Why do Shoppers Often Behave Like Lemmings?. Investor's Business Daily @@FIXIT, 4.
• [97] Karen Pennar NY. February 1995. Why investors stampede. Business Week @@FIXIT, 84-85.
• [18] Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel. September 1997. Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids. Working Paper: Boston University and University of Vienna.
• [112] Z Neeman, GO Orosel. March 1999. Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids. Journal Of Economic Theory 85:1, 91-121.
• [126] Lee-Bath Nelson. 1998. Persistence and Reversal in Herd Behavior. Working Paper: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
• [39] S.H. Oda, K. Miura, Kanji Ueda, Yasunori Baba. August 1996. The application of cellular automata to Network Externalities in Consumers' Theory: A Generalization of Life Game. Working Paper: Japan.
• [69] Andreas Oehler. January 1996. Do Mutual Funds Specializing in German Stocks Herd?. Working Paper: Universitaet Bamberg.
• [40] Marco Ottaviani. October 1995. Monopoly Pricing with Social Learning. Working Paper: MIT Economics Dept.
• [127] Marco Ottaviani, Peter Sorenson. 1998. Herd Behavior and Investment: Comment. Working Paper: MIT.
• [19] Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago.
• [130] Josef Perktold. 1996. Recurring Informational Cascades. Working Paper: University of Chicago.
• [92] Charles Phelps. summer 1992. Diffusion of Information in Medical Care. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:3, 23-42.
• [70] Raghuram G. Rajan. 1994. Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 436, 399-442.
• [41] Matt Ridley. 1996. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. Publisher: Viking/Penguin Books 375 Hudson Street, NY NY 10014.
• [111] Nordell SE, Valone TJ. September 1998. Mate choice copying as public information. Ecology Letters 1:2, 74-76.
• [73] Ingo Schlupp, Michael J. Ryan. 1996. Male Sailfin Mollies (Poecilia latipinna) copy the mate choice of other males. Behavioral Ecology @FIXIT, forthcoming.
• [91] Ingo Schlupp, Cathy Marler, Michael J. Ryan. January 1994. Benefit to Male Sailfin Mollies of Mating with Heterospecific Females. Science 263, 373-374.
• [98] Vincent J. Schodolski. February 1995. Funds' wired wallets cause shock waves in, beyond emerging markets mexico crisis highlights the hazards of "hot money". Chicago Tribune @@FIXIT, @@FIXIT.
• [42] Robert J. Shiller. December 1995. Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior. American Economic Review 85:2, 181-185.
• [71] Robert J. Shiller. April 1996. Why do people dislike inflation. Working Paper: NBER #5539.
• [72] Robert J. Shiller. September 1997. Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System. Working Paper: yale university.
• [43] Gerald Simons, Gautam Bhattacharya. December 1994. Price Competition, Quality Choice and Informational Cascades. Working Paper: Department of Economics, University of Kanses Lawrence, Kansas 66045, (913) 864-3501.
• [20] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1995. Pathological Models of Observational Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT.
• [21] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. October 1997. Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation. Working Paper: MIT, Economics Department and Nuffield College/Oxford University.
• [22] Lones Smith, Peter Sorenson. July 1994. An Example of Non-Martingale Learning. Working Paper: Department of Economics, MIT.
• [44] Stephen D. Smith, Larry D. Wall. January 1992. Financial Panics, Bank Failures, and the Role of Regulatory Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review @FIXIT, 1-11.
• [115] David Stead. ?. A General Theory of Enclosures. Working Paper: Oxford University.
• [74] Cass Sunstein. 1996. Social Norms and Social Roles. Columbia Law Review 18, @@FIXIT.
• [45] Nikolaos Vettas. June 1995. Demand and Supply in New Markets: Diffusion with Bilateral Learning. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
• [46] Nikolaos Vettas. March 1995. On the Informational Role of Quantities: Durable Goods and Consumers' word of mouth. Working Paper: The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
• [7] Ivo Welch. 1999. Imitation and Conformity . Working Paper: Yale/SOM.
• [10] Ivo Welch. June 1992. Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades. Journal of Finance 47:2, 695-732.
• [75] Ivo Welch. November 2000. Herding Among Security Analysts. Journal of Financial Economics ?, ?.
• [76] Russ Wermers. April 1999. Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices. Journal of Finance ?, ?.
• [23] Jianbo Zhang. Spring 1997. Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades. Rand Journal of Economics 28:1, 188-205.
• [47] Jianbo Zhang, Zhentang Zhang. August 1994. Information and Payoff Externality in an Oligopoly Market. Working Paper: University of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas 66045.
• [77] Leon Zurawicki. 1997. Fashion and Fancy in Direct Foreign Investment. Journal of International Investment 1:1, @@FIXIT (Note: author is from U Mass/Boston).

Not Yet Described and Classified

Too much to do. I wish I had added:

• Duncan Watts, A simple model of global cascades on random networks, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99-9, April 2002, 5766-5771.
• Nicolas Melissas, Herd Behavior as an Incentive Scheme, Institut d' Analisi Economica, Spain.
• Nicolas Melissas, Informational Cascades Elicit Private InformationHerd, Institut d' Analisi Economica, Spain.
• Vladislav Karguine. "Prevention of herding by experts." Economics Letters 78 (2003) 401-407.